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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 5, 2015, over 3 million gallons of toxic sludge were 
unleashed from Gold King Mine into the Animas River in Colorado.  
Headline news documented the event with some unusual photos: 
brave kayakers paddling through the bright orange water,1 a confused 
resident holding up a bottle of something resembling “Sunny 
Delight,”2 and aerial shots of the snaking Animas River, yellowish-
orange for miles.3  Also unusual about the disaster was an ironic 
twist: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—the federal 
agency tasked with protecting the environment—in fact caused the 
spill when their contractors breached a holding during a leak 
investigation.4  Following the spill, states of emergency were 
declared in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and the Navajo Nation, 
since the acidic water was unsafe and laced with toxic harmful heavy 
metals such as arsenic, lead, copper, and cadmium.5  
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2017, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
1 Casey Leins, photo by Jerry McBride, Photos: Mine Waste Spill Pollutes 
Animas River, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/photos/2015/08/11/photos-mine-waste-spill-
pollutes-animas-river. 
2 Jerry McBride (@jerryphotog), TWITTER (Aug. 6, 2016, 10:20 AM), 
https://twitter.com/jerryphotog/status/629341358663331840 (photo of Rayna 
Willhite of Aztec holding a bottle of water collected from the Animas River). 
3 Tobias Salinger, EPA mine cleanup accident leaks yellow sludge from old 
Colorado mine into river; agency triples contamination estimate, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/epa-cleanup-
accident-leaks-yellow-sludge-river-article-1.2319500. 
4 Julie Turkewitz, Colorado Spill Heightens Debate Over Future of Old Mines, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/animas-river-
colorado-mine-spill-epa.html. 
5 See Bruce Finley & Tom McGhee, Animas mine disaster: Arsenic, cadmium, 
lead broke water limits, DENVER POST (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.denverpost.com/environment/ci_28614946/epa-taking-damage-claims-
toxic-spill-animas-river (Colorado declares state of emergency); Susan Montoya 
Bryan & Ellen Knickmeyer, New Mexico governor declares state of emergency 
after Colorado mine spill contaminates rivers, O.C. REGISTER (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/water-676896-mexico-new.html (New Mexico 
and Navajo Nation declare states of emergency); Dennis Romboy, Utah declares 
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While questions regarding EPA liability took the spotlight 
immediately following the disaster, the incident also brought 
nationwide attention to the much larger concern of abandoned legacy 
mines.  The Gold King Mine ceased operating in 1924.6  An 
estimated 250,000 and 500,000 similar abandoned mines litter the 
landscape across the United States.7  They are “ticking time bombs” 
that threaten people and the environment, and the cost and liability 
involved in cleanup efforts is unwieldy—an estimated total of $20-54 
billion.8  
This article begins with a description of the alarming matter of 
abandoned mines, mainly due to the issue of acid mine drainage.  
Then, it provides a detailed account of the Gold King disaster, 
including the current state of affairs surrounding the question of EPA 
liability.  Next, it provides a simplified overview of some of the 
federal statutory hurdles that make it difficult to tackle remediation of 
abandoned hardrock mines.  In wake of Gold King, another round of 
legislation has been proposed that might help, and these proposed 
bills center on familiar themes of reforming the General Mining Law 
of 1872 and providing Good Samaritan waivers to environmental 
regulations.  The strengths, weaknesses, and difficulties of the 
proposed legislation are evaluated in this article.  Lastly, some 
potential federal regulatory solutions are briefly presented.  This 
article is limited to discussion of federal legislative and regulatory 
solutions, even though states are engaged in solving these problems 
                                                            
state of emergency, considers legal action over EPA spill, KSL.COM (Aug. 12, 
2015), https://www.ksl.com/?sid=35931048&nid=148 (Utah declares state of 
emergency). 
6 Bridget Huber, No End in Sight for Toxic Legacy of Abandoned Mines, 
FAIRWARNING (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.fairwarning.org/2015/12/toxic-heritage/. 
7 Reforming the U.S. Hardrock Mining Law of 1872: The Price of Inaction, 
THE PEW CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING 4 (2009), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/ref
orming20mining20lawpdf.pdf. For an interactive map of inactive metal mining 
operations in the U.S., see Abandoned Mines, EARTHWORKS, 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/abandoned_mines#.Vq5xuzbe3dk 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
8  See, SenatorTomUdall, On Anniversary of Gold King Mine Spill, Tom Calls 
for Action on Hardrock Mining Reform, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1H0v8B2_Rbg&noredirect=1 (calling the 
abandoned mines a “ticking time bomb” at 2:59, and noting they will take  $20-54 
billion to cleanup at 3:13-3:18).  
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as well.9  Abandoned hardrock mines are a perpetual, pressing 
concern to human health and the environment, and the law needs to 
change in order to facilitate cleanup, ensure adequate compensation 
of injured parties, and prevent future disasters like Gold King. 
 
II.  ACID MINE DRAINAGE: A PERPETUAL THREAT TO THE PUBLIC 
AND WATERSHEDS 
 
A broader understanding of the problems surrounding abandoned 
hardrock mines puts the Gold King disaster into its proper context.  
Hardrock mining—in contrast to soft-rock mining of resources such 
as coal—is the extraction of minerals from metamorphic or igneous 
rock.10  These minerals include gold, silver, copper, nickel, zinc, 
others.11  Mining these precious metals is an important component of 
the national economy, and the minerals are used in a wide variety of 
goods and for national defense efforts.12 
While hardrock mining has been vital to the economy’s health for 
over a century, it has also exacted its toll on the health of watershed 
ecosystems and downstream communities.13 The boom-and-bust 
                                                            
9 See, e.g., Inactive Mine Reclamation Program, COLORADO DEP’T OF NAT. 
RES., DEP’T OF RECLAMATION MINING AND SAFETY, 
http://mining.state.co.us/Programs/Abandoned/Pages/impwelcomepage.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2016); About Us, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF CONSERVATION 
ABANDONED MINE LANDS PROGRAM, 
http://www.conservation.ca.gov/omr/abandoned_mine_lands (last visited Mar. 31, 
2016). 
10 Julia Layton, How Underground Mining Works: Hard-Rock Underground 
Mining, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (May 21, 2013), 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/engineering/structural/underground-
mining1.htm. 
11 Id. 
12 EPA’s Nat’l Hardrock Mining Framework, E.P.A., 1 (Sept. 1997), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
10/documents/hardrock_mining_framework_0.pdf. 
13 Burden of Gilt, MINERAL POLICY CTR., 3 (June 1993), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/REPORT-Burden-of-Gilt.pdf.  
In 2005, the Mineral Policy Center and the Oil and Gas Accountability Project 
joined forces to become Earthworks, a nonprofit organization that is “dedicated to 
protecting communities and the environment from the adverse impacts of mineral 
and energy development while promoting sustainable solutions.” About 
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nature of mining over the last two centuries has often caused mining 
companies to close up shop and declare bankruptcy, leaving many 
sites abandoned without adequate environmental protections in 
place.14  Further, before the environmental regulation began in the 
1970’s, the mining industry was largely unregulated in their 
operations.15  
Tragic fatal accidents occur on abandoned mine sites each year,16 
yet the biggest problem posed by abandoned mines is a phenomenon 
called acid mine drainage.  From the beginning, miners noticed that 
their operations turned the water different colors, even though they 
did not fully understand the environmental consequences.17  The 
constant leaching of acid mine drainage was the problem that the 
EPA was trying to fix at Gold King, when they instead breached a 
holding full of this toxic sludge.18  Chemically, the basic explanation 
of acid mine drainage is that it forms when the three components of 
sulfide minerals, oxygen, and water mix together, yielding acid and 
dissolved metals.19  It occurs in hardrock mining because pyrite is an 
iron sulfide present in most of the waste rock.20  Sometimes, the 
waste rock is left in large chunks, but often it is milled into a fine 
powder, called mine tailings.21  Ground-up tailings and mine waste 
are two of the worst culprits of acid mine drainage.22 When pyrite 
                                                            
EARTHWORKS, EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/about (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
14 See MINERAL POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 1. 
15 Id. 
16 See Previous Fatal Accident Summaries, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.msha.gov/sosa/previousfatalstats.asp (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2016) (cataloging the causes of fatal accidents each year at active 
and abandoned mine sites). 
17 Patricia Nelson Limerick, Joseph N. Ryan, Timothy R. Brown & T. Allan 
Comp, Cleaning Up Abandoned Hardrock Mines in the West: Prospecting for a 
Better Future, UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER CTR. OF THE AMERICAN W., 17 (2005), 
http://www.centerwest.org/publications/pdf/mines.pdf. 
18 Salinger, supra note 3. 
19 Limerick et al., supra note 17, at 16. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 17. 
22 See Acid Mine Drainage and Effects on Fish Health and Ecology: A Review, 
RECLAMATION RESEARCH GRP., 3-4 (June 2008), 
http://reclamationresearch.net/publications/Final_Lit_Review_AMD.pdf. 
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and oxygen mix, the pyrite oxidizes (i.e. it rusts).23  Water enters the 
mines through either rainfall or streams; sometimes the water is 
already inside the mine.24  As the water interacts with the rusted rock, 
it carries away a toxic mixture of heavy metals and acidic (low pH) 
water, which is the acid mine drainage.25  This phenomenon happens 
“anywhere on the mine where sulfides are exposed to air and water 
— including waste rock piles, tailings, open pits, underground 
tunnels, and leach pads.”26  The acid dissolves toxic metals into the 
water such as “zinc, arsenic, cadmium, lead, copper, and selenium.”27  
This chemical combination of acid and metal often turns the water 
strange colors such as yellow, orange, or even a bluish-white.28  
While it is quite true that a certain level of water acidity occurs 
naturally in mineral-heavy areas, mining operations exponentially 
increase the acidity formed by this natural process through exposing 
the water to an increased surface area of sulfide minerals.29 
                                                            
23 Limerick et al., supra note 17, at 16. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Acid Mine Drainage, EARTHWORKS 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/acid_mine_drainage#.Vkoe20szJg0 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016).  For a helpful visual what acid mine drainage looks like 
at one extremely contaminated “Superfund” site, see Diagram of Acid Mine 
Drainage at Iron Mountain Mine, U.S.G.S. CAL. WATER SCI. CTR., 
http://ca.water.usgs.gov/projects/iron_mountain/images/acid_mine_drainage.png 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
27 See Limerick et al., supra note 17, at 16. 
28 To see picture of a creek that has turned an eerie bluish-white due to 
aluminum hydroxide runoff, see Andy Sheehan, Experts: Runoff From Abandoned 
Mines Is Killing Pa.’s Waterways, CBS PITTSBURG (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2015/04/29/acid-mine-runoff/. 
29 Limerick et al., supra note 17, at 18.  Coffee brewing is a simple illustration 
that comes to mind to help explain the difference between naturally-occurring 
water acidity on mineral-laden lands and toxic acid mine drainage.  If boiling water 
is poured over whole, unground beans of coffee, the result is, at best, a yellowish-
brown cup of hot water with a little bit of caffeine in it.  However, if the same 
coffee beans are finely ground and then the hot water is poured over them, the 
result is a delicious cup of morning jet-fuel.  Similarly, rocks left to themselves are 
like whole-bean coffee: when the water and air interact with the sulfide minerals, 
some acid and metals are released into the water.  When those same rocks are 
ground up, these mine tailings are similar to coffee grounds.  Snowmelt and 
precipitation “brew” through the tailings, creating acid mine drainage—much like a 
freshly-brewed cup of coffee, but slightly less delicious. 
 
 ,*+. 
&" " " 367
When the acid and metal content is high enough in a stream, it 
creates what is known as a “dead” stream.30  In streams and rivers, 
high metal concentrations are often lethal to fish that are in the 
water.31  Further, in terms of fish reproduction, when deposits from 
rusting sulfides settle to the bottom of a streambed, the deposits form 
an “impenetrable layer” between the sandy gravel and the water, 
known as “armoring.”32  Armoring prevents fish from making their 
nests and spawning in the gravel at the bottom of stream-beds.33  
Bugs, near the bottom of the food chain, are similarly prevented from 
burrowing and accessing their habitat.34  When the acid mine 
drainage is bad enough, the stream becomes a “dead” stream that is 
incapable of supporting aquatic life.35  Reclamation Research Group 
explains the matter simply: “[w]ater contaminated by AMD [acid 
mine drainage], often containing elevated concentrations of metals, 
can be toxic to aquatic organisms, leaving receiving streams devoid 
of most living creatures.”36  
The Iron Mountain Mine Superfund37 site in California provides 
an example of what can happen when acid mine drainage is really 
extreme.  Both the EPA and the United States Geological Survey 
tend to slightly euphemize the concern of “dead” streams by instead 
referring to the “fish kills” at Iron Mountain.38  While “fish kills” are 
                                                            
30 Id. at 19. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 RECLAMATION RESEARCH GRP., supra note 22, at 5. 
37 The term “Superfund” is commonly used to refer to several different things 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).  A “Superfund” site is a highly contaminated site that has 
been placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).  The term “Superfund” is also 
commonly used to refer to the statute of CERCLA itself.  Lastly, and a bit 
anachronistically, Superfund refers to the pot of money used to facilitate cleanups 
under CERCLA; very little money is left in the fund.  See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, 
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVTL. 
REGULATION: LAW, SCI., AND POLICY 412-13 (Walters Kluwer Law & Business 
7th ed. 2013). 
38 E.g., Tech. Document: Acid Mine Drainage Prediction, E.P.A., 42 (Dec. 
1994) 
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certainly a concern, a more complete description of the extent of 
ecological damage at Iron Mountain is as follows: 
Contaminated water from the mine is metal-laden and 
more than 6,300 times more acidic than battery acid, 
which has caused the virtual elimination of aquatic life 
in sections of Slickrock, Boulder and Spring Creeks.  
Impacted organisms include Chinook salmon, 
steelhead and other resident trout species, hundreds of 
species of aquatic insects, clams, mussels and plants 
in the Sacramento River.  Between 1981 and 1996 
approximately 20 million fall-run Chinook salmon 
were killed in the river.  Spring Creek downstream of 
the Stowell Mine and Iron Mountain Mine will never 
be clean enough to support a fishery.39  
Certainly more than just fish are killed in the river—the entire 
ecosystem is destroyed by severe acid mine drainage.  In another 
Superfund example, acid runoff from the Summitville Mine in 
Colorado killed all biological life along the Alamosa River for 
seventeen miles; after earning a place on the National Priorities List 
for its extreme level of environmental degradation, the EPA has so 
far spent over $210 million trying to remediate it.40  While the impact 
of acid mine drainage on fish is well-documented, acid mine drainage 
also adversely impacts birds,41 and probably poses a threat to larger 
                                                            
https://www3.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special/mining/techdocs/amd.pdf 
(“fishery productivity loss and periodic fish kills have been observed.”); 
Environmental Effects of Iron Mountain, U.S.G.S. CAL. WATER SCI. CTR., 
http://ca.water.usgs.gov/projects/iron_mountain/environment.html (click tab to 
“Aquatic Life”) (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“A major flush-out event caused by 
heavy rains in 1955 led to a massive fish kill”). 
39 Polluting the Future: How Mining Companies are Contaminating Our 
Nation’s Waters in Perpetuity, EARTHWORKS, 12 (May 2013), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/PollutingTheFuture-
FINAL.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Polluting the Future]. 
40 Acid Mine Drainage, EARTHWORKS, supra note 26.   
41 T.H. Watkins, Mining’s Hard Rock Legacy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 
2000), http://science.nationalgeographic.com/science/earth/inside-the-earth/hard-
rock/#page=7 (311 dead birds so far that spring in Coeur d'Alene River Basin, 
Washington, due to lead poisoning from toxic drainage, in a region where the river 
“runs cleaner” than it used to run). 
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animals and marine life as well.42  In the mining region where Gold 
King is located, the Upper Animas Mining District, regions of 
Cement Creek and the Upper Animas River have been mostly devoid 
of fish and aquatic life due to acid mine drainage for many years;43 
due to outcry from the community and industry, the area has 
continued to evade listing on the National Priorities List.44  The tide 
seems to be turning after Gold King, with renewed, serious talks of 
Superfund listing for the area.45  Colorado Governor Hickenlooper 
recently gave his formal endorsement of a Superfund cleanup of over 
fifty mines in Colorado, including Gold King.46   
                                                            
42 See, Acid Mine Drainage: devastating to aquatic life, GREENPEACE, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-
content/uploads/legacy/Global/usa/planet3/PDFs/acid-mine-drainage-
devastatin.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
43 Upper Animas Mining District, E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/region8/upper-
animas-mining-district (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).  
Metals concentrations in the Animas River below Mineral Creek have 
eliminated virtually all fish down to Elk Creek and all cutthroat and 
rainbow trout down to Cascade Creek, where only a small community of 
brook and brown trout exists.  Results also predict fish populations are 
likely impaired down to at least Bakers Bridge. 
Id.  
44 Chase Olivarius-Mcallister, Superfund: A dirty word to some in Silverton, 
DURANGO HERALD (Aug. 3, 2013 8:14 PM), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20130803/NEWS01/130809831/Superfund:
-A-dirty-word-to-some-in-Silverton. 
45 Bruce Finley, Gold King Superfund talks loom; local officials favor narrow 
EPA role, DENVER POST (Dec. 4, 2015, 2:47 AM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/animas-river/ci_29199431/gold-king-superfund-talks-
loom-local-officials-favor; Associated Press, Governor gets support for mine spill 
Superfund listing, GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://gazette.com/governor-
gets-support-for-mine-spill-superfund-listing/article/1569418; Letters to the Editor, 
Superfund, DURANGO HERALD (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20160227/OPINION01/160229627/0/SEAR
CH/Superfund (“Silverton and San Juan County’s unanimous vote on Monday 
asking Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper to pursue a Superfund listing for the 
mine array that is compromising water quality in the Animas River’s headwaters 
marked an historic turning point.”). 
46  Grace Hood, Hickenlooper Approves Superfund Application For Gold King 
Mine, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 29 2016), 
https://www.cpr.org/news/newsbeat/hickenlooper-approves-superfund-application-
gold-king-mine#sthash.0kfKv8j5.dpuf. 
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When acid mine drainage enters municipal surface water supplies 
and groundwater, it poses significant threats to human health if not 
properly treated.47  Nearly two decades ago, an Economic Report of 
the President stated that hardrock mining had polluted 3,346 miles of 
rivers and streams in the West with concerning toxics, including 
cyanide, asbestos, and mercury.48  All of these are harmful toxins, 
and threaten the water supplies of communities downstream of mine 
sites. 
The breadth of the problem and exorbitant cost of fixing it cannot 
be overstated.  There are an estimated 557,650 hardrock abandoned 
mine sites across the nation.49  There are various estimates on the 
cost of cleanup, ranging from as low as $20-54 billion50 to as high as 
$32.7 - $71.5 billion.51  The Government Accountability Office 
estimates that there are 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in the 
12 western states and Alaska alone.52  Of these, an estimated 33,000 
have degraded the environment, either by contaminating water or 
leaving arsenic-contaminated tailings piles.53  It may seem an 
obvious point, but the very fact that the mines have been abandoned 
over the decades makes assignment of liability for cleanup very 
difficult, if not impossible.  Establishing liability at these sites “will 
rarely be feasible or cost-effective, and even in cases of more recent 
abandonment, the offending company will typically either have gone 
bankrupt or will have been taken over by a corporate entity that had 
nothing to do with the original crime.”54  Further, while CERCLA—
the statute designed to govern cleanup of hazardous sites—would 
                                                            
47 David Gerard, The Mining Law of 1872: Digging a Little Deeper, PROP. AND 
ENV’T RESEARCH CTR. (1997), http://www.perc.org/articles/mining-law-1872-0. 
48 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 219 (Feb. 1997), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1997.pdf. 
49 MINERAL POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 4. 
50 SenatorTomUdall, supra note 8. 
51 MINERAL POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 3. 
52 Abandoned Mines: Information on the Number of Hardrock Mines, Cost of 
Cleanup, and Value of Financial Assurances, GAO-11-834T Before the Subcomm. 
on Energy & Mineral Resource of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, preface 
(July 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126667.pdf (statement of Anu. K. 
Mittal, Dir. Natural Resources & Env’t. Team).  
53 Id. 
54 MINERAL POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 51-52. 
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seem capable of facilitating cleanup, the D.C. Circuit recently noted 
that there is a huge problem of bankrupt mining companies falling 
outside of CERCLA’s liability scheme: “[a]lthough CERCLA 
requires operators to pay to clean up hazardous releases, see 42 
U.S.C.  § 9607(a), many avoid payment by structuring their 
operations so they never have to pay.  It is a common practice for 
operators to avoid paying environmental liabilities by declaring 
bankruptcy or otherwise sheltering assets.”55  Since there is often no 
private party left to shoulder liability, either taxpayers bear the 
burden of cleanup56 or residents endure the negative health impacts 
of unremediated sites.57 
The matter gets worse—infinitely.  Because acid mine drainage is 
a chemical reaction between the exposed rock, water, and oxygen, it 
will continue for as long as water comes into contact with the site.58 
In other words, the contamination is perpetual.  Even properly 
remediated sites and treatment facilities will require periodic 
monitoring for centuries (and probably millennia)—long after the 
expected existence of any mining corporation.59 
The scale of the matter is massive.  As discussed in Sections IV 
and V, below, the United States is already having great difficulty 
figuring out how to remediate mine sites that were abandoned over 
the last two centuries; these are generally much smaller in scale than 
today’s mining operations.  We are only beginning to see the scope 
of the catastrophic damage caused by more recent large-scale 
operations.  Just one example of the massive scale of mining in 
recent decades and exorbitant cost of remediation is the Zortman-
                                                            
55 In re Idaho Conservation League, USCA Case #14-1149 Document 
#15960811, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2016),  
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/0/1F012EA1238D7A3C85257
F490054E52E/$file/14-1149-1596081.pdf.  This recent decision, which requires 
the EPA to regulate financial assurances for hardrock mining, is further discussed 
infra Section V. 
56 THE PEW CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING, supra note 7. 
57 Aimee Boulanger & Alexandra Gorman, Hardrock Mining: Risks to 
Community Health, EARTHWORKS, 3-5 (2004), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/MiningHealthReport_WVE.pd
f?pubs/MiningHealthReport_WVE.pdf. 
58 Polluting the Future, supra note 39, at 4. 
59 Id. 
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Landusky site in Montana.60  Zortman-Landusky was a massive 
operation that extracted gold from open-pit mines using toxic cyanide 
heap leaching methods from 1979 to 1998.61  The operation had a 
meager $30 million reclamation bond and $10 million water 
treatment bond put up by the mining company, Pegasus Gold; these 
bonds have been used for the past ten years, but do not cover the full 
cost of remediation.62  With Pegasus now bankrupt, the federal 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the state of Montana are 
footing the rest of the bill—they have already spent $12 million in 
taxpayer dollars.63  The site requires $1.5 million to operate annually, 
and only half of that amount is covered by Pegasus Gold’s water 
reclamation bond.64  Zortman-Landusky is yet another example of 
mining companies “externalizing” their true costs of operation (i.e.  
the damages imposed on ecosystems and human health) to the rest of 
today’s society, as well as to future generations.65  Mining operations 
have exponentially grown in scale in recent decades, and will 
continue to do so; therefore, the problem of mine cleanup liability 
will only be exacerbated in the future.66 
                                                            
60 The satellite view of the Zortman-Landusky site gives a sense of the massive 
scale of modern mining operations.  See Fort Belnap Reservation, EARTHWORKS, 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/index.php/voices/detail/fort_belknap_reservatio
n#.VtD4_jbe3dk (click link under map “click to view larger map of Zortman-
Landusky mines”).  To get a sense of how mines like these pose a tremendous 
threat to human health, see id. at main page (Dean Stiffarm of the Fort Belknap 
tribe holding up a glass of bright orange water, which is the mine runoff). 
61 Zortman Landusky Mines, MONT. DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://deq.mt.gov/recovery/remediation/zortmanlandusky/default.mcpx (last visited 
Feb 7, 2016) 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150128210240/http://deq.mt.gov/recovery/remediat
ion/ZortmanLandusky/default.mcpx].  For further reading on the Zortman-
Landusky mine and a plea for more adequate financial assurances, see generally, 
William Barlow, Insult to Injury: How Government Requirements Should Protect 
the Public from Hardrock Mine Contamination and the Financial Liability of Its 
Reclamation, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 339 (2006). 
62 MONT. DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 61. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 MINERAL POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 1. 
66 For further information on some of the challenges in present-day mining, 
including how to address the legacy of abandoned historic and modern hard rock 
mines, see Watkins, supra note 41. 
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In summary, history shows that there are almost two certainties 
surrounding the issue: mining companies will go bankrupt, and there 
will be a mess left behind.67  What is left to be determined is how the 
problem will be addressed now and how much of the hardship will be 
passed on to future generations. 
 
III.  THE EPA AND LIABILITY FOR GOLD KING 
 
The history of what happened at Gold King first requires a bit of 
history about the Upper Animas Mining District, located high in the 
Rocky Mountains near Silverton, Colorado.  Since the late-1800s, 
this area has been heavily mined for its mineral deposits.68  In the 
1990s, the EPA began evaluating the Upper Animas region for 
Superfund status, since the area was contaminated heavily with 
“severe impacts to aquatic life in the UA [Upper Animas] and its 
tributaries from naturally occurring and mining-related heavy 
metals.”69  Industry and residents strongly resisted Superfund 
designation through their lobbying efforts, largely out of fear that the 
designation would harm the mining and tourism industries.70  
Notably, in 2011, a mining company in the region and Potentially 
Responsible Party (PRP) under CERCLA, Sunnyside Gold 
Corporation, offered $6.5 million to avoid Superfund designation.71 
Through these negotiations, the “town and the agency came to a sort 
of detente,” and the EPA agreed not to list the area on the National 
Priorities List provided that efforts were made to clean it up.72  Since 
the 1990s, remediation of the area has largely been a piecemeal, 
                                                            
67 Polluting the Future, supra note 39, at 5.  
68 Upper Animas Mining District, E.P.A., supra note 43 (“Active mining in 
and around Silverton started around 1870 and ended in 1991”). 
69 Id. 
70 Olivarius-Mcallister, supra note 44. 
71 Sunnyside Gold Corporation offered in $6.5 mitigation to address water 
quality issues in Cement Creek and the Upper Animas River.  Mark Esper, 
Sunnyside Gold Corp. offers 6.5 million, THE SILVERTON STANDARD AND THE 
MINER (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.silvertonstandard.com/news.php?id=378. 
72 Stephanie Paige Ogburn, Why Was The Environmental Protection Agency 
Messing With A Mine Above Silverton?, KUNC.ORG (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.kunc.org/post/why-was-environmental-protection-agency-messing-
mine-above-silverton#stream/0. 
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collaborative effort by the EPA, the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment (CDPHE), the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), a mining industry group called the Animas River 
Stakeholders Group (ARSG), the Sunnyside Gold Corporation 
(SGC), and other local government and agencies.73 
Up until the early 2000s, the water quality in the Upper Animas 
seemed to be improving through these piecemeal efforts.74  However, 
since the early 2000s, the water quality “has not improved and, for at 
least 20 miles below the confluence with Cement Creek, has declined 
significantly.”75 What happened?  In order to reduce the amount of 
acid mine drainage over the last few decades, many of the nearby 
mines, including the large Sunnyside Mine, were “plugged” using 
hydraulic bulkheads to keep the water inside the mines.76  This 
practice is used as an alternative “singular solution” as opposed to 
perpetual water treatment systems, which are costly and can require 
indefinite maintenance.77  The Upper Animas Region is a heavily 
mined region with many interconnected tunnels and various geologic 
features, and therefore “plugging” some of the mines and tunnels can 
lead to more water flowing out of others.78  According to a technical 
evaluation of the Gold King blowout prepared by the Department of 
the Interior (DOI), the “plugging” of the American Tunnel and 
Sunnyside Mine in 1993 and the Mogul Mine in 2003 facilitated the 
conditions leading up to the blowout, and drastically increased the 
amount of acid mine drainage coming from the Red and Bonita Mine, 
                                                            
73 See Upper Animas Mining District, E.P.A., supra note 43. 
74 See Technical Evaluation of the Gold King Mine Incident, BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, 18, 22 (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.usbr.gov/docs/goldkingminereport.pdf (describing the significantly 
increased acid mine drainage from various mines beginning in 2000); Upper 
Animas Mining District, E.P.A., supra note 43 (water quality began deteriorating in 
2005). 
75 Upper Animas Mining District, E.P.A., supra note 43. 
76 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 74, at 17-18.   
77 “Most bulkheads start out as a singular solution.” Kirstin Brown, 
Underground Bulkheads, COLO. DIV. OF RECLAMATION MINING & SAFETY, 
http://www.animasriverstakeholdersgroup.org/attachments/File/Bulkheads.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 7 ,2016). The “[b]enefits of [b]ulkheads” include “prevent[ion] [of] the 
formation of Acid Mine Drainage” and the “[l]ack or minimization of perpetual 
water treatment.” Id. 
78 Ogburn, supra note 72. 
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as well as from Gold King.79  In part, the EPA allowed Sunnyside 
Corporation to plug the American Tunnel after a consent decree 
settlement80 was reached between Sunnyside Corporation and the 
Colorado Water Quality Control Division, which freed Sunnyside 
Corporation from responsibility for perpetual water agreement in 
exchange for their cleanup of a few smaller sites.81 
This background on the hydraulic bulkheads helps explain some 
of the events directly leading up to the blowout.  While the region 
was still not a Superfund site, the EPA stepped in to address the 
contamination with a then-estimated $1.5 million effort to stop the 
drainage coming from Red and Bonita as a result of blockheading of 
the American Tunnel.82  Red and Bonita Mines are below Gold King, 
and all three mines flow into Cement Creek, a tributary to the 
Animas River.83  The plan was to install two bulkheads (i.e. massive 
plugs) on Red and Bonita, and the EPA needed to first “remove the 
blockage and reconstruct the portal at the Gold King Mine in order to 
best observe possible changes in discharge caused by the installation 
                                                            
79 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 74, at 1, 17-18, B-3 (American 
Tunnel) and B-4 (Mogul Mine). 
80 Consent Decree, Sunnyside Gold Corp. v. Colo. Water Quality Control Div., 
94 CV 5459 (City & Cty. of Denver Dist. Ct. 1996), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/08-
1136165.cdwattachcwqd_0.pdf. 
81 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 74, at 18.  
In May 1996, a consent decree was signed between the Colorado 
Department of Health and Environment and Sunnyside Gold, 
Inc., to allow the discontinuation of perpetual water treatment.  
An essential part of the agreement was that Sunnyside would 
undertake reclamation of numerous acid sources in the area to 
offset the residual acid seepage expected to continue to 
discharge from the American Tunnel.  With the additional waste 
removal and reclamation work underway, they commenced the 
installation of hydraulic bulkheads. 
Id. 
82 Mary Shinn, EPA to plug Silverton mine soon, DURANGO HERALD (June 28, 
2015), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20150628/NEWS01/150629600/0/SEARCH
/EPA-to-plug-Silverton-mine-soon. 
83 Red and Bonita Mine Bulkhead Construction, REGION 8, E.P.A., (May 
2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/upper-
animas-red-and-bonita-bulkhead-fact-sheet-5-22-2015.pdf. 
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of Red and Bonita Mine bulkhead.”84  Essentially, this project was an 
“experiment” just like plugging the American Tunnel, so the EPA 
wanted to make sure that they could at least monitor drainage coming 
from the nearby mines as a result of the upcoming Red and Bonita 
bulkhead project.85  
Therefore, when the EPA unleashed 3 million gallons of toxic 
sludge from Gold King on August 5, 2015, some argue that their 
mistakes were really the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”86  In an 
internal report, the EPA said that the blowout was “likely inevitable” 
under the conditions.87  Still, the EPA has been subject to heavy 
scrutiny for their mistakes at Gold King, and at the time of writing 
this article, lawsuits are emerging.88  Public outcry immediately 
ensued against the EPA for the spill when several states were unable 
to drink their water, and those who relied on the water for agriculture, 
tourism, and livestock took a huge financial hit.89  EPA 
                                                            
84 Id. 
85 “ ‘This, in a way, is as much as experiment as the American Tunnel,’ said 
Steve Fearn, co-coordinator of the Animas River Stakeholders Group.” Shinn, 
supra note 82 “ ‘The EPA understands that this new bulkhead could have the same 
effect as the American Tunnel bulkheads and cause water to drain from other 
mines.  As a result, the agency plans to monitor the Gold King number 7 level and 
the Mogul because they are both nearby,’ Way said.” Id.   
86 Meg Lentz, Animas River Release: 143 Years in the Making, PROJECT ON 
GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.pogo.org/blog/2015/08/colorado-
animas-river-release.html?referrer=http%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FkqYMlnt0S2. 
87 Internal Review of the August 5, 2015 Gold King Mine Blowout, E.P.A. 9 
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/new_epa_nmt_gold_king_internal_review_report_aug_24_2015fnld
ated_redacted.pdf. 
88 Russell Contreras & Susan Montoya Bryan, New Mexico first to issue plans 
to sue EPA, Colorado over Gold King Mine spill, DURANGO HERALD (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20160114/NEWS02/160119758/-
1/s/New-Mexico-first-to-issue-plans-to-sue-EPA-Colorado-over-Gold-King-Mine-
spill; Lindsay Whitehurst, Utah prepares lawsuit against EPA over mine spill 
contamination, STANDARD EXAMINER (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.standard.net/Environment/2016/02/12/Utah-No-EPA-alert-about-metal-
in-water-after-mine-spill. 
89 EPA's Gold King Mine Disaster: Examining the Harmful Impacts to Indian 
Country, Senate Indian Affairs Committee Hearing, 114th Cong. (2015) WLNR 
27599357 (statement by Douglas Eakin, President-American Action Forum) 
(“Local business centered around the river has dried up, farming has come to a halt 
and the sheer public safety threat that the 3 million plus gallons of toxic mining 
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Administrator Gina McCarthy assured the public shortly after the 
disaster that the Agency would be “taking responsibility to ensure 
that it is cleaned up,”90 but many have expressed doubt over what full 
responsibility would look like from an agency that some feel has too 
much power and not enough oversight.91  The EPA also received 
heavy critique that it took too long to communicate the emergency to 
the effected states, especially the sovereign Navajo Nation, whom it 
took two full days for the EPA to inform.92  There were also concerns 
over the fact that part of the delay was due to lack of cell service or a 
satellite phone at the remote mine site.93  In the months that followed, 
an official investigation by the Department of the Interior revealed 
that the EPA could have prevented the disaster if they had been more 
careful in checking water levels.94  The EPA looked particularly 
                                                            
waste created has left waterways in Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona in 
peril.  Studies suggest it will take decades to restore the affected waterways and 
surrounding areas.” 
90 Gina McCarthy, Remarks on Gold King Mine, E.P.A., (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www2.epa.gov/goldkingmine/epa-administrator-gina-mccarthy-8112015-
remarks-gold-king-mine.  
91 Rachel Leven, Senators Strike at EPA Treatment of Navajo Nation, WATER, 
LAW, & POLICY MONITOR (BNA) No. 38, at “Mining” (Sept. 24, 2015). 
92 Watch Live: Senate Hearing on Gold King Mine Spill, ROLL CALL (Sept. 16, 
2015), 
http://video.rollcall.com/video/watch_live_senate_hearing_on_gold_king_mine_spi
ll (Senator Gardner’s comments at 18:14-20:24); 161 CONG. REC. S7541 (daily ed. 
Oct. 27, 2016) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“In her testimony, Administrator 
McCarthy portrayed the EPA’s response to the tribes as timely, but her portrayal 
was directly contradicted by the testimony of the Navajo president, who noted that 
it took EPA 2 days to notify the tribe about the plume’s threat to the tribe.”). 
93 EPA Toxic River Spill, Hearing before the S. Env’t and Pub. Works Comm., 
114th Cong., C-SPAN (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.c-span.org/video/?328127-
1/epa-administrator-gina-mccarthy-testimony-gold-king-mine-wastewater-spill 
(comments of Senator Fischer at 1:25:20-1:27:05).  
94 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 74.   
A critical difference between the Gold King plan and that used at 
the Red and Bonita Mine in 2011 was the use in the latter case of a 
drill rig to bore into the mine from above and directly determine 
the level of the mine pool prior to excavating backfill at the portal.  
Although this was apparently considered at Gold King, it was not 
done.  Had it been done, the plan to open the mine would have 
been revised, and the blowout would not have occurred.”  
Id. 
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negligent in the edited footage that was released of the spill as it 
happened, when their contractors shouted “Get outa here . . .  what do 
we do now?”95 
Despite differing opinions as to the actual level of fault that can 
rightfully be attributed to the EPA, the agency has stated that they 
will take responsibility for the blowout.96  Questions remain as to 
what responsibility will look like when states and individuals seek 
compensation from a very powerful federal agency.  At the time of 
writing this article, there are several actions underway to hold the 
EPA and others liable for the Gold King spill.  On January 14, 2016, 
the New Mexico Environment Department filed a notice of intent to 
sue the EPA for “creating an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the health of New Mexico’s citizens and the environment of the 
Animas and San Juan Rivers in New Mexico.”97  The state intends to 
file a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) Section 7002(a)(1)(B), and will “pursue injunctive relief, 
future costs and legal fees.”98  RCRA is the environmental statute 
that governs solid waste disposal; the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 
42 U.S.C.  § 6972(a)(1)(B), allows for injunctive relief “against any 
person, including the United States .  .  .  who has contributed or who 
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which 
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or 
the environment.”99  The citizen suit provision is also known as the 
“private attorney-general provision,” and gives private individuals a 
right of action to enforce the environmental regulatory regime of 
RCRA.100  The remedy of the citizen suit is injunctive rather than 
                                                            
95 The HARRY READ ME File,  EPA releases Gold King Mine blowout 
footage: ‘Get outta here?!... What do we do now?’, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBlR05tDCbI. 
96 Gina McCarthy Remarks, supra note 90. 
97 Notice of Endangerment and Intent to Sue under Section 7002(a)(1)(B) of 
the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, Jackson Gilmour & Dobbs PC (Jan 
14, 2016), 
https://www.env.nm.gov/OOTS/documents/NMED_RCRA_Notice_of_Intent_rega
rding_Animas_River_Spill_002.pdf. 
98Id. at 1-2. 
99 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012). 
100 Bologna v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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monetary, and therefore could require the EPA to be “responsible for 
site investigation, monitoring and testing costs as well as an order 
barring further endangerment;” this remedy would not require money 
damages, such as plaintiff’s past cleanup costs.101  Before New 
Mexico can file suit, they must provide a ninety-day notice to the 
EPA, in keeping with 42 U.S.C.  § 6972(b)(2)(A).  If causation is 
established, the citizen suit provision of RCRA generally provides for 
joint and several liability and, similarly to CERCLA, allows for strict 
liability.102  Under this scheme of liability, given the EPA’s 
negligence in not checking the water levels, discussed above, New 
Mexico could potentially prevail in the RCRA citizen’s suit, and the 
EPA would then be required to test, monitor, and ensure water 
quality in New Mexico.  In their letter of intent to sue the EPA, New 
Mexico stated that they intend to follow through on the suit unless 
the EPA “begin[s] to take meaningful measures to clean up the 
affected areas and agree to a long-term plan that will research and 
monitor the effects of the toxic spill.”103  The coming months and 
years will reveal the outcome of this potential litigation. 
To address damages to persons or property caused by the spill,104 
the EPA quickly set up a claims process under the existing Standard 
                                                            
101 Carter E. Strang, RCRA Citizen Suits for Injunctive Relief, TUCKER ELLIS & 
WEST LLP, 
http://www.tuckerellis.com/files/rcra_citizen_suits_for_injunctive_relief.pdf 
102 Id. at 2, “Liability is joint and several unless the defendant can establish that 
the damages are divisible and that there is a reasonable basis for an 
apportionment.” (citing Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F. 3d 
277 (1st Cir. 2006); Waste, Inc. Cost Recovery Group v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 51 
F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 1999); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 
F. Supp. 162 (D.C. Mo. 1985)). “Liability is strict, as is true under CERCLA, 
though there is legislative language that can be cited to the contrary.” (citing United 
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F. 2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Cox v. 
City of Dallas, 256 F. 3d 281 (5th Cir. 2001)).  
103 New Mexico Environment Department Announces Intent to Sue U.S. EPA 
for 2015 Massive Waste Spill, STATE OF N.M. ENV’T DEPT. (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.env.nm.gov/OOTS/documents/160114PR-
OOTSNoticeIntentToSueEPA.pdf. 
104 Personal injury firms have also seized on the opportunity to offer their 
services and free consultations to spill victims, including “The Navajo Nation, 
[r]anchers, [f]armers, [b]usinesses that draw water from the river, [and i]ndividuals 
with illnesses from water contamination.” See, e.g., Gold King Mine Spill, STERN 
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Form 95 for claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).105  
The EPA’s general, two-paged form is “used to present claims 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
for property damage, personal injury, or death allegedly caused by a 
federal employee's negligence or wrongful act or omission occurring 
within the scope of the employee's federal employment.”106  Enacted 
in 1946, the FTCA is a limited waiver of the United States’ immunity 
from suit, allowing claims for damages when the “United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant” for the act or 
omission.107  Essentially, Form 95 is a tool that helps parties “settle” 
with the EPA rather than filing a lawsuit.  While not required for 
FTCA claims, the EPA maintains that Form 95 is a convenient 
format that ensures all the relevant information is included in the 
claim.108  
There are two important requirements for claims brought under 
the FTCA with Standard Form 95: first, the claim must be brought 
“within two years after the claim accrues,” and second, a “sum 
certain” (i.e. a specific amount) of monetary damages must be 
specified.109  Failure of either of these requirements invalidates the 
claim.  Under this process, the EPA has told the public that 
individuals, businesses, or governmental entities can “amend [their] 
claim at any time prior to reaching a settlement with EPA, or before 
[they] file a lawsuit under the FTCA.”110  Additionally, if the claim is 
                                                            
LAW GROUP, http://www.stern-lawgroup.com/Gold-King-Mine-Spill.aspx (last 
visited Feb 20, 2016).  
105 Claims Process and Standard Form 95 for Damage, Injury or Death as a 
Result of Gold King Mine Release, E.P.A., 
http://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/claims-process-and-standard-form-95-damage-
injury-or-death-result-gold-king-mine (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
106 Id. 
107 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). 
108 Claims Process and Standard Form 95, E.P.A., supra note 105. 
109 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1105-0008, STANDARD FORM 95: CLAIM 
FOR DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/standardform95_4.pdf (form emphasizing “SUM CERTAIN” and 
“TWO YEARS”) (emphasis in original). 
110 Frequent Questions About Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Claims 
Processing, E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/frequent-questions-about-
federal-tort-claims-act-ftca-claims-processing (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
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denied or ignored for six months, then claimants can sue the EPA 
under the FTCA, under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).111  However, there is 
some confusion due to language on the form itself, which appears to 
indicate that claiming a specific amount on the form obligates the 
claimant to accept that amount, and also bars future redress for 
unknown injuries.  The clause states in the following bolded and 
capitalized wording: “I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF 
CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES 
CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO 
ACCEPT SAID AMOUNT IN FULL SATISFACTION AND 
FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CLAIM.”112  Navajo Nation 
Attorney General Ethel Branch believes that this clause is  “a 
significant limiting clause that, despite assurances from the USEPA, 
could limit or waive the future rights of claimants.”113  Due to worry 
over this clause and the alleged tactics of EPA workers going door-
to-door on the Navajo Reservation to get individuals to sign claims 
forms, the Navajo Nation felt that the EPA was trying to force Native 
Americans to waive their rights to future claims stemming from the 
Gold King disaster.114  Despite Form 95’s ambiguous language, the 
EPA has assured the public that claims may be amended up until 
final settlement; still, the process provides no redress for harms that 
were unknown at the time of the original claim.115  The Navajo 
Nation has pressed the EPA to act fairly, and may eventually file 
suit.116 
                                                            
111  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012). 
112 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 109.  
113 Andrew Westney, Navajo Nation Presses EPA To Treat Mine Spill Claims 
Fairly, LAW360 (Oct 6, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/711678/navajo-
nation-presses-epa-to-treat-mine-spill-claims-fairly. 
114 Stephen Dinan, EPA denies cheating Navajo on Gold King Mine spill, says 
future claims will be allowed, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/13/epa-denies-cheating-navajo-
gold-king-mine/. 
115 “You may amend your claim at any time prior to reaching a settlement with 
EPA . . . If you accept a final settlement from EPA for your claim related to the 
Gold King Mine accident, you may not pursue additional claims originating from 
the Gold King Mine accident.” Frequent Questions About Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) Claims Processing, E.P.A., supra note 110.  
116 Andrew Westney, supra note 113. 
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Others beside the Navajo Nation are not completely satisfied with 
the relief for disaster victims provided by the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA).  On September 22, 2015, Senator Tom Udall (D-New 
Mexico), with co-sponsors Senators Martin Heinrich (D-New 
Mexico) and Michael Bennet (D-Colorado) introduced S.2063, the 
Gold King Mine Spill Recovery Act of 2015.117  The bill would 
house an “Office of Gold King Mine Spill Claims” within the EPA to 
administer FTCA claims of injured parties (Section 4).118  Further, it 
would require long-term water quality monitoring (Section 5), and 
amend CERCLA to require assessment and a priority plan for 
abandoned mines (Section 6).119  In September 2015, the bill was 
referred to the Senate committee, read twice, and referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.120  It has not gone anywhere since.  
Despite the seeming reasonableness of the proposed legislation to 
assure that victims of Gold King are adequately compensated, a 
website called govtrack.us, which tracks various proposed bills, gives 
the legislation an estimated zero percent chance of ever being 
enacted.121  
A state Representative from Colorado, Don Coram (R-Montrose), 
introduced a short-lived bill that would have taken a much more 
aggressive approach to holding the EPA liable by “allow[ing] the 
state to file lawsuits against the federal government on behalf of 
individuals financially impacted by the Gold King Mine spill” under 
the FTCA.122  There have already been a number of claims filed; so 
far, the EPA has received 41 claims from individuals affected by the 
disaster.123  Essentially, the bill124 would have allowed the state of 
                                                            
117 Gold King Mine Spill Recovery Act of 2015 (Introduced in Senate - IS), 
S.2063.IS, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
114s2063is/pdf/BILLS-114s2063is.pdf. 
118 Id. at § 4. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Gold King Mine Spill Recovery Act of 2015, S. 2063, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114s2063is/pdf/BILLS-114s2063is.pdf. 
122 Peter Marcus, Bill would allow lawsuits after Gold King Mine spill north of 
Durango, DURANGO HERALD (Dec 27, 2015), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20151227/NEWS01/151229679/Bill-would-
allow-lawsuits-after-Gold-King-Mine-spill-north-of-Durango. 
123 Id. 
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Colorado to sue the EPA on behalf of its citizens under the FTCA, if 
the EPA reneged on their duty to compensate those who were 
adversely impacted by the spill.125  The short-lived bill died in a 5-4 
vote.126   
In conclusion, while many have rushed to point the finger at the 
EPA for their negligence in causing the spill,127 others have pointed 
out the reality that cleaning up these abandoned mines is a difficult, 
risky endeavor.128  Further, unlike mining companies who may have 
financially benefited from the initial mining of the land, the EPA had 
no financial interest in Gold King or any of the surrounding mines; 
their efforts were done in order to follow their mission of “protecting 
human health and the environment.”129  While subsequent reports 
unveiled that the EPA was not careful enough in their clean up 
endeavors, this does not change the root concern: there are still 
hundreds of thousands of abandoned mines like Gold King that 
                                                            
124 H. 16-1055, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016), 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2016a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/24DAA8320899DC48
87257F240063FE80?Open&file=1055_01.pdf. 
125 Marcus, supra note 122. 
126 Peter Marcus, Gold King Mine spill legislation drowns in Colorado 
Legislature, DURANGO HERALD (Jan 27, 2016), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20160127/NEWS01/160129614/Gold-King-
Mine-spill-legislation-drowns-in-Colorado-Legislature. 
127 161 CONG. REC. H5790 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Burgess).  
Mr. Speaker, I will just ask: Has anyone been fired?  Has anyone 
been held accountable at the Environmental Protection Agency for 
this disaster?  No, they have not.  What would have happened had 
a private company been responsible for a disaster of this order of 
magnitude?  I shudder to think where those people in charge of that 
company would be today.  The EPA did not follow its own 
procedures. It did not have proper communications equipment at 
the site of the disaster.  They had no satellite phone.  They had no 
radio.  As a consequence, they did not notify local officials until a 
day later of what had occurred at the mine.  They have also refused 
to answer questions about the potential health risks in the polluted 
water to humans and animals downriver. 
Id. 
128 Huber, supra note 6. 
129 Our Mission and What We Do, E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-
mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
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require remediation.130  Placing all the focus on ensuring that the 
EPA is held accountable by calling for criminal prosecution of EPA 
officials or impeachment of Administrator Gina McCarthy distracts 
from the bigger issue. Given the decades of EPA pressure on industry 
stakeholders to either clean up the Upper Animas or face Superfund 
designation, and their failure to do so adequately without EPA 
intervention, Lauren Pagel at Earthworks has said that blaming the 
EPA is “like blaming the fire department for kicking down your door 
to put out your house fire.  After you ignored the fire marshal’s 
warnings.  And cut the fire department’s budget.”131  To extend the 
analogy further, pointing the finger also does not answer the 
questions of how the fire started, or how future fires can be 
prevented.  In the next two sections, the broader answers to these 
questions in regards to abandoned legacy mines are discussed. 
 
IV.  FEDERAL STATUTORY OBSTACLES AND PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION 
 
A.  Amending the Mining Law of 1872 
 
Understanding the legal quandaries that have allowed acid mine 
drainage to largely go unregulated requires a look at the General 
Mining Law of 1872.  Many have noted that the Mining Law has 
remained unchanged since it was passed shortly after the Civil War 
in 1872—in itself one big reason some that argue it should be 
updated.132  The Mining Law was passed in the wake of the 
California Gold Rush and similar Western mining booms in the mid-
nineteenth century, and was intended to encourage movement to 
                                                            
130 See PEW CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING and EARTHWORKS, supra 
note 7.  
131Statement of Earthworks Policy Director, Lauren Pagel, on Sep 8 House 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee Hearing regarding the Gold King 
Mine/Animas River disaster, EARTHWORKS (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/statement_of_earthworks_policy_di
rector_lauren_pagel_on_sep_8_house_science#.VkYvaUszJg0. 
132 See General Mining Law of 1872, EARTHWORKS, 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/general_mining_law_of_1872#.Vk
oodUszJg0 (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
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sparsely populated Western lands.133  Most of the minerals were 
located on federal lands, but no standardized laws governed the 
transfer of ownership of these lands from the federal government to 
the miners.134  In 1872, Congress combined and amended the 
customs, codes, and laws surrounding mining into the General 
Mining Law.135  The cornerstone of the Mining Law is self-initiation 
or free access, the principle that citizens and companies can search 
for minerals without authorization from any government agency.  
That is: 
[i]f a site contains a deposit that can be profitably 
marketed, claimants enjoy the "right to mine," 
regardless of any alternative use, potential use, or non-
use value of the land.  Until recently, claimants 
maintained their rights by satisfying an annual work 
requirement, but in 1992 Congress replaced this 
requirement with an annual $100 holding fee for each 
claim.  Claimants then may acquire outright title both 
to the minerals and the land by obtaining a mineral 
patent, at a per-acre cost of $2.50-$5.  Producers do 
not pay royalty taxes on the minerals taken from 
federal lands.136 
In summary, at $2.50-$5 per acre, the General Mining Law of 
1872 practically gives away public lands for nearly nothing to those 
who would like to stake a mining claim.   
The General Mining Law has jurisdictional coverage over 270 
million acres of publicly owned land, which is almost one-fourth of 
all land in the United States, and two-thirds of the land that the U.S.  
Government “holds in trust for all Americans.”137  The law mostly 
covers extraction of hardrock minerals not governed by other laws, 
and does not include extraction of coal, oil, or natural gas.138  
Roughly $1 billion worth of hardrock minerals are extracted each 
                                                            
133 Gerard, supra note 47. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 General Mining Law of 1872 - Polluter of water, provider of pork, 
EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/EWfs-
1872MiningLaw-WaterPolluterPorkProvider-low.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
138 Id. 
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year from America’s public lands, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimates, resulting in an estimated $40 
million in lost royalties annually.139 
Advocates for both a healthy environment and responsible 
government express concern that the General Mining Law of 1972 
gives away public land to private companies practically for free, and 
the public then bears the costs of polluted water and cleaning up the 
mining operations.140  As discussed in Sections I and II above, and 
particularly in Part II with the example of Zortman-Landunsky,141 the 
cost to taxpayers is astronomical, and treatment is required in 
perpetuity.   The Mining Law contains no environmental protections 
conditional on use of the land for mining, and therefore regulation of 
the use of the land must come from other sources, such as the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management.142  Many have criticized 
the Mining Law heavily since there are no royalty provisions, and 
therefore “billions of dollars of federal resources can pass into private 
hands for a pittance through the patenting process.”143  A law that 
was originally written to benefit Western prospectors now primarily 
benefits billion-dollar, multi-national corporations, many of which 
are foreign-owned.144  Some have critically characterized the law as a 
“140-year-old law that allows foreign companies to make a profit off 
of resources owned by the collective American public.”145  
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, seven of the ten top gold 
                                                            
139 THE PEW CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING, supra note 7. 
140 Id. See also, General Mining Law of 1872, EARTHWORKS, supra note 132.  
141 See supra notes 60-65. 
142 Gerard, supra note 47; see, e.g., Mining Laws, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/regulations/mining_claims.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2016). 
143 Gerard, supra note 47. 
1441872 Mining Law - the Need for Reform, EARTHWORKS, 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/1872_mining_law_the_need_for_re
form#.Vko2XUszJg1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
145 Rachael Bale, Foreign-owned mines operate royalty-free under outdated 
US law, REVEAL (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/foreign-
owned-mines-operate-royalty-free-under-outdated-us-law/. The journalist seems 
particularly concerned that a foreign-owned company, Hong Kong’s Azarga 
Resources, might pollute the water supply in nearby communities through toxic 
uranium mining at the Dewey Burdock project, without paying any royalties to the 
United States government. 
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producing mines are foreign-owned.146  On the other hand, mining 
companies argue that they already pay their fair share in taxes, and 
do not want to a pay a royalty on top of taxes for their use of federal 
lands.  However, advocates for reform have emphasized that the 
General Mining Law of 1872 was created in an era when the 
government was encouraging settlement and mining of scarcely-
populated lands out West—a policy reason that cannot be justified in 
today’s world, where populations only continue to grow and are 
adversely effected by nearby mining operations.147  With this 
increase in population, the law needs to reflect that the “highest use” 
of public lands is not just mining, but a balance of interests such as 
“energy development, recreation, conservation, and other 
interests.”148  If not, the Mining Law will continue to show 
“deferential treatment afforded [to] hardrock mine operators .  .  .  
result[ing] in damages costing the public dearly not only in the form 
of severe environmental damage, but the financial liability of its 
reclamation as well.”149 
While advocates seek many reforms to the General Mining Law 
of 1872,150 the main proposed reforms involve the imposition of 
                                                            
146 1872 Mining Law - the Need for Reform, EARTHWORKS, supra note 144; 
See 2009 Minerals Yearbook: Gold, U.S.G.S. 31.15 (Mar. 2011), 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/gold/myb1-2009-gold.pdf 
(Table 3: Leading Gold-Producing Mines in the United States in 2009, in Order of 
Output: Barrick Gold Corp., Canada; Newmont Mining Corp., United States; 
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., United States, but wholly owned subsidiary of Rio 
Tinto Group, United Kingdom; Kinross Gold Corp., Canada; Sumitomo Metal 
Mining Co., Japan; AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., South Africa). 
147 See, 1872 Mining Law - the Need for Reform, EARTHWORKS, supra note 
144.  
148 Summary of the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015, 
EARTHWORKS (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/library/detail/hardrock_mining_and_reclamation
_act_of_2015#.VreZQTbe3dk. 
149 Barlow, supra note 61, at 355. 
150 1872 Mining Law - Reform Requirements, EARTHWORKS, 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/1872_mining_law_reform_require
ments#.VrZHsTbe3dk (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).  One extremely important 
problem with the General Mining Law of 1872 is the “lack of any provisions 
relating to environmental protection.” Jeffrey A. Kodish, Restoring Inactive and 
Abandoned Mine Sites: A Guide to Managing Environmental Liabilities, 16 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 381, 382 (2001). 
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royalties and the creation of a hardrock mining reclamation fund, 
similar to what is in place for comparable industries such as coal 
mining.151  Coal, oil, and natural gas pay between 8 and 12.5 percent 
in royalties.152  Royalty and reclamation fund legislation has been 
proposed in the past,153 but the Gold King disaster has brought a 
resurgence of attention to it.  In 2015, the 114th Congress took up the 
issue in the Senate, when Senate sponsor Tom Udall (D-NM) and co-
sponsors Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Michael Bennett (D-CO), Ron 
Wyden (D-OR) and Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced S.2254, the 
“Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015.”154  A similar bill, 
H.R.963, was proposed in the House several months before the Gold 
King spill on February 13, 2015, by Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), 
entitled the “Hardrock Mining Reform and Reclamation Act of 
2015.”155  Commenters have noted that “[t]he proposed legislation 
would represent a sea change for those miners and companies who 
are accustomed to operating on federal land under the 1872 
system.”156  The key reforms would amend the 1872 Mining Law to 
require royalties and establishment of a reclamation fund.   
The royalty provisions of the House and Senate bills vary.  In the 
Senate, S.2254 allows the Secretary of the Interior to set a 
“reasonable royalty rate between 2 and 5 percent of “the gross 
                                                            
151 See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation, 30 U.S.C. Ch. 25 
(2012). 
152 Summary of the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015, 
EARTHWORKS, supra note 148. 
153 See, eg., Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2007, H.R. 2262, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (4% & 8% royalties). For a discussion of proposed legislation in the 
1990’s, see Paul Stokstad, Structuring a Reclamation Program for Abandoned 
Noncoal Mines, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 121, 144-45 (1998) (discussing H.R. 1580, 
104th Cong. (1995); S. 506, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 357, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 
257, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 322, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 775, 103d Cong. (1993); 
H.R. 1708, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 918, 102d Cong. (1992)).   
154 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015, S. 2254, 114th Cong. 
(2015).  
155 Hardrock Mining and Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 963, 114th Cong. (2015). 
156 Anne Harrington & Gregory Louer, Republicans and Democrats Push for 
Hardrock Mining Reform in the Wake of Colorado Mine Spill, FRESH 
PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY & HEALTH (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.freshlawblog.com/2015/12/01/republicans-and-democrats-push-for-
hardrock-mining-reform-in-the-wake-of-colorado-mine-spill/. 
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income from mining for production of all locatable minerals.”157  
Section 202(a) provides for relief from the royalty if the mining 
company can show by “clear and convincing evidence” that, “without 
the reduction in royalty, production would not occur.”158  Notably, 
the Senate bill exempts existing mining operations from the royalty 
and only imposes the royalty on new operations;159 this is in sharp 
contrast with the House bill, H.R.963, which levies an 8 percent 
royalty on new mines, and 4 percent on existing mines.160  The 
Senate bill’s failure to impose a royalty on existing mines could 
create an impediment to collecting the necessary revenue for costly 
mine cleanup; therefore, the House bill might be superior in assuring 
adequate funding for cleanup due to its more robust royalty 
provision. 
The reclamation fund provisions are also slightly different in each 
bill.  Under the Senate bill, new and existing hardrock mine operators 
would pay a reclamation fee between 0.6 percent and 2 percent of 
“the value of the production from the hardrock minerals mining 
operation for each calendar year”161 into a newly created U.S. 
Treasury Hardrock Minerals Reclamation Fund.  The Fund would 
authorize the Secretary of Interior to use amounts in the Fund—
subject to availability by appropriations—for “reclamation and 
restoration of land and water resources adversely affected by past 
hardrock minerals and mining and related activities in abandoned 
hardrock mine States.”162  The Fund would have a hierarchy of 
priorities to allocate resources for cleanup, similar to Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), which places 
human health, safety, and property as the highest priority.163  The 
Senate bill’s sponsors estimate that up to $100 million annually could 
be generated from reclamation fees alone.164  For the House bill, H.R. 
                                                            
157 S. 2254, 114th Cong. § 201(a) (2015). 
158 S. 2254, 114th Cong. § 202(a) (2015). 
159 S. 2254, 114th Cong. § 201(c) (2015). 
160 H.R. 963, 114th Cong. § 102(a)(1)-(2) (2015). 
161 S. 2254, 114th Cong. § 403(a) (2015). 
162 S. 2254, 114th Cong. § 402(a)(1) (2015). 
163 See Bart Lounsbury, Digging Out of the Holes We've Made: Hardrock 
Mining, Good Samaritans, and the Need for Comprehensive Action, 32 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 197 (2008). 
164 Harrington & Louer, supra note 156. 
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963, a “Displaced Material Reclamation Fee” of 7 cents per ton of 
displaced material is levied on operators, and then placed into a 
similar Hardrock Minerals Fund.165  The difference between the 
Senate bill’s “value of production” and the House bill’s “per ton” 
reclamation fee needs to be compared in order to see which one will 
generate more funding for reclamation; given the cost of abandoned 
mine reclamation, preference should be given to the bill that provides 
more funding. 
Both bills have been introduced and referred to 
committees, but no further progress has been made recently.  
Given that the Democrats do not currently have the majority 
in Congress, and Republicans are hesitant to impose any 
royalties that might appear to harm the mining industry, it is 
unlikely that these reforms will occur in Congress’ current 
session.166  
Historically, the mining industry has argued that they are already 
paying enough in taxes, and the addition of royalties and reclamation 
fees would curtail domestic metal production.  “In 2008, there were 
$20 billion in sales in U.S. metals, and we paid about $8.3 billion in 
various taxes on that,” said Carol Raulston, a spokeswoman for the 
National Mining Association.167  However, as it currently stands, the 
Government has no idea what volume of hardrock minerals are being 
extracted from federal public lands each year, since there is no 
requirement to pay royalties or report extraction volume.168  The 
                                                            
165 H.R. 963, 114th Cong. § 405 (2015). For a more detailed discussion of a 
proposed hardrock reclamation fund and other alternatives, such as a fund created 
through CERCLA, see Bart Lounsbury, supra note 163, at 195-203. 
166 See S. 2254: Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2254 (last visited Feb. 
20, 2016) (4% chance of being enacted), H.R. 963: Hardrock Mining Reform and 
Reclamation Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr963 (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (7% 
chance of being enacted). 
167 Jason Dearen, GAO report shows royalties from hard-rock mining could 
generate billions for U.S., if collected, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://missoulian.com/business/local/gao-report-shows-royalties-from-hard-rock-
mining-could-generate/article_b76de304-4574-11e2-963a-001a4bcf887a.html. 
168 The GAO report found the following: 
Regarding the availability of data on hardrock minerals, we found 
that federal agencies generally do not collect data from hardrock 
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public has expressed concern that this system allows foreign 
companies to extract public resources with no accountability.169  
Environmental advocates urge that money is the key resource needed 
for cleanup of these costly abandoned mine sites, and that a 
reclamation fund is essential to facilitate abandoned mine cleanup.170  
For these reasons, the General Mining Law of 1872 needs to be 
amended to include royalties and a reclamation fund for mining 
conducted on federal lands, similar to the requirements placed on 
similar mineral extraction industries such as coal.171  
                                                            
mine operators on the amount and value of hardrock minerals 
extracted from federal lands because there is no federal royalty 
that would necessitate doing so.  Furthermore, while many 
western states collect data on the hardrock minerals produced in 
their state for purposes of assessing a state royalty, they generally 
do not collect data on the volume of those minerals extracted 
from federal land within those states. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-45R, MINERAL RESOURCES: 
MINERAL VOLUME, VALUE, AND REVENUE 3 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650122.pdf. 
169 Dearen, supra note 167. Commenter troutcreek (Dec, 15, 2012 6:44am) 
writes:  
Royalties need to be paid for the ore removed from public lands, 
there needs to be some control over foreign companies that seem 
to dominate the mining industry in the US.  How long will it be 
before China begins to invest in the "free ride" and becomes a 
major player in the industry? We do need some mechanism in 
place that protects "special places", mining companies 
unfortunately do not have the ability to recognize unique and 
fragile regions that should never be mined. 
Id. Commenter Sukey (Dec. 16, 2012 5:44am) writes: “If I'm not mistaken, 
Canada already owns a number of mines in the US, reaping profit off America's 
land (there's huge mines all over Nevada that are now in Canadian hands).” Id. For 
a report on the millions of dollars in U.S. taxpayer liability caused by bankrupted 
Canadian mining companies, supporting these commenter’s positions, see 
Canadian Mining Companies: Costing U.S. Taxpayers and the Environment, 
EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/CanCoFS.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
170 The non-profit advocacy group Earthworks maintains that the “[r]eal 
[s]olution to [c]lean [u]p [o]ld [m]ines [is] [m]oney.” Good Samaritan Legislation 
Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS 
(2015), https://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/FACTSHEET_-
_Good_Samaritan_2015.pdf.  
171 30 U.S.C. §1231 et seq. (2012). 
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The normative question is simple: as between mining companies 
and taxpayers, who is better situated to bear the burden for 
remediation of abandoned mines?  Congress needs to break their 
silence evidenced by decades of failed legislation that has resulted in 
taxpayers bearing the burden, and instead place responsibility on the 
shoulders of the better-situated party.  The primary vehicle that would 
facilitate cleanup of abandoned mines is a major revision of the 
General Mining Law of 1872 that includes royalties and reclamation 
fees.172 
 
B.  “Good Samaritan” Waivers 
 
Before discussing the proposed Good Samaritan waivers, a brief 
explanation will be provided explaining how two statutes—the Clean 
Water Act (CWA)173 and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)—create 
unintended obstacles for parties who would otherwise wish to help 
remediate abandoned mines.  Other literature provides a much more 
in-depth explanations of these statutes and several other 
environmental regulations, and the various other ways in which they 
might be amended to allow for cleanup of abandoned mines174—
inquiries that are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
The Clean Water Act was passed to accomplish the “[r]estoration 
and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of 
Nation's waters.”175  The CWA is an extensive water permitting 
system that is accomplished through cooperative federalism, or a 
regulatory structure that allocates some responsibility to state 
agencies and some responsibility to the EPA to carry out the Act’s 
                                                            
172 For a discussion of other laws regulating federal lands that could also be 
amended, such as the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955 and the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, see John F. Seymour, Hardrock 
Mining and the Environment: Issues of Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 824-847 (2004). 
173 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 are now 
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). PERCIVAL, ET. AL, supra note 37, at 665. 
174 See Lounsbury, supra note 163, at 197; Seymour, supra note 172, at 797; 
Kodish, supra note 150. 
175 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
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regulatory purposes.176  Under the CWA, discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waterways from a point source is prohibited unless 
authorized by a permit.177  The Act defines “pollutants” as “dredged 
spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage 
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar 
dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into 
water.”178  A “point source” is any “discernable, confined, and 
discrete conveyance.”179  The “discharge of a pollutant” is “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”180  One main way that the Act regulates point source 
discharges is through § 402, the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program, which allows 
discharge of pollutants provided that the permit requirements are 
met.181  There is a Clean Water Act violation when a plaintiff 
“prove[s] that defendants (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant 
(3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source.”182  Citizen suits 
are authorized under the Act to assist in enforcement (i.e. force 
compliance with the NPDES permitting system); individuals with 
standing are authorized to bring suit.183   
                                                            
176 See Katie M. Sweeney & Sherrie A. Armstrong, Cooperative Federalism in 
Environmental Law: A Growing Role for Industry, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. 2-5 
(2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resource
s/2013/10/21st_fall_conference/conference_materials/17-sweeney_katie-
paper.authcheckdam.pdf. 
177 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) (“except as otherwise provided in the Act, the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”) 
178 § 1362(6) (2012). 
179 § 1362(14) (2012). 
180 § 1362(12) (2012). 
181 §§ 1251–1376 (2012). 
182 Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 
308 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Ntn’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
183 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) authorizes citizen suits.  In order to “satisfy Article 
III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show “injury in fact,” causation, and 
redressability.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 
169 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 560–61 (1992)). 
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While the comprehensive regulatory structure of the CWA does 
much to protect the Nation’s valuable water resources, one 
consequence of the permitting system is that parties who attempt to 
cleanup abandoned mines will likely become subject to its extensive 
permitting requirements. For example, in Committee To Save 
Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utilities District,184 the East 
Bay Municipal Utility District (the District) and the members of the 
California Regional Water Quality Control Board (the Board) 
attempted to cleanup the Penn Mine.  The abandoned site contained a 
copper and zinc mine that operated intermittently from the 1860s 
through the 1950s.185  Much like the many abandoned mines 
discussed earlier in this article, the “site left behind reactive mine 
tailings, waste rock, and excavated ores” which, “[w]hen exposed to 
oxygen and water . . . form[ed] ‘acid mine drainage,’ which contains 
high concentrations of aluminum, cadmium, copper, zinc, iron, and 
sulfuric acid.”186  To curb the catastrophic water pollution from 
entering San Francisco’s water supply, the Board and the District 
built the Penn Mine Facility and constructed dams that would catch 
and treat the acid mine drainage runoff, preventing it from polluting 
the Mokelumne River.187  Plaintiffs wanted to make the Board and 
District operate the Penn Mine Facility under a NPDES permit.188  
The court found that the collection and treatment of the surface 
runoff acid mine drainage was considered a “discharge of a 
pollutant” contained in the regulations,189 and all elements of a CWA 
violation were met.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, 
finding that the Board and the District were “owners or operators” 
subject to the NPDES permitting requirements of a CWA.190  The 
                                                            
184 13 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1993). 
185 Id. at 306. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id at 307. 
189 The court notes that such surface runoff is expressly listed under the 
definition of “discharge of a pollutant” contained in the regulations under 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2, which states that “[d]ischarge of a pollutant means . . . additions of 
pollutants into waters of the United States from: surface runoff which is collected 
or channelled by man.” Id. at 308. 
190 Id. at 310. 
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Board and the District were therefore required to get a permit and 
meet the water quality standards under the Clean Water Act, or face 
the consequences (i.e. fines191) for violations.192  A permit was 
required regardless of whether the cleanup activity aggravated or 
improved the water quality issues.193  
 The concurring opinion by Judge Ferdinand Francis Fernandez 
foresaw the logical consequences of this decision.  He wrote: 
Appellants earnestly argue that the EPA's approach, 
and that of the appellee's, will not serve the long-term 
purpose of bettering the aquatic environment.  They 
indicate that it takes no genius or epopt to see what the 
message will be.  Do nothing!  Let someone else take 
on the responsibility.  Let the water degrade, let the 
fish die, but protect your pocketbook from vast and 
unnecessary expenditures.  Do not try to bring some 
order out of environmental chaos.  In short, appellants 
suggest that no Odysseus or Daedalus crafted the 
policy which we are now asked to follow.  Perhaps 
they are correct; I suspect they are.194 
Judge Fernandez’s concurrence was reluctant; he noted that 
judges are not policymakers, and that he was obligated to apply the 
law as it was written.195  Thereafter, Mokelumne River sent a clear 
message to future parties that might consider cleaning up abandoned 
mines: do not bother cleaning them up; instead, shield yourself from 
liability while the water quality continues to worsen. In addition to 
the requirement of obtaining an NPDES permit when conducting 
cleanup activities, some waters are subject to more stringent water 
                                                            
191 The CWA has several criminal provisions, including fines and prison time 
for violations. See generally Criminal Provisions of the Clean Water Act, E.P.A., 
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-clean-water-act (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2016).  
192 Comm. to Save Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d at 309. 
193 “The statute [CWA] does not require the Committee to show that a greater 
level of pollution enters the Mokelumne now than was the case before the Penn 
Mine facility was constructed.” Id. 
194 Id. at 310 (Fernandez, J., concurring). 
195 Id. 
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quality standards and require higher technology-based standards in 
order to operate under the permit196 
 CERCLA is the primary statute designed to clean up sites that are 
already contaminated with hazardous substances and pollutants, and 
it is commonly referred as the “Superfund” due to the large fund that 
it created for cleanup of contaminated sites.197  Similarly to the 
CWA, CERCLA creates potential liability for parties that might 
attempt to clean up abandoned mines; distinguishably, the potential 
liability for parties is postponed to the future and usually takes the 
form of lawsuits for either cost recovery or contribution.  The statute 
authorizes the EPA “to respond to environmental emergencies 
involving hazardous substances and contaminants, initiate 
investigations and clean-ups, and take enforcement actions.”198  
Under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), CERCLA authorizes 
the EPA to either engage in short term cleanup in response to 
emergencies or long-term cleanup for larger cleanup projects.199  For 
long-term cleanups, once the EPA goes through the public process of 
listing a site on the National Priorities List (NPL) (i.e. Superfund), it 
can either require a party to clean up the site, or clean up the site and 
then recover costs of cleanup from any Potentially Responsible 
Parties (PRPs).200  In turn, the sued PRP can file a “contribution” suit 
against any other PRP.201  This process reflects “[o]ne of the most 
controversial and dramatic aspects of CERCLA . . . the imposition of 
strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability.”202  This all-
encompassing “black hole [of liability] that indiscriminately devours 
                                                            
196 STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 
114TH CONGRESS, ABANDONED MINES IN THE UNITED STATES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR GOOD SAMARITAN CLEANUPS 4 (Oct. 16, 2015), 
http://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2015-10-21_-_water_ssm.pdf. 
197 “CERCLA is commonly known as “Superfund” because the statute 
authorized the creation of a large fund to pay for the clean-up of the nation's worst 
hazardous waste sites.” Kodish, supra note 150, at n.15. 
198 Id. at 384. 
199 PERCIVAL, ET. AL, supra note 37, at 458. CERCLA authorizes the federal 
government to clean up abandoned mines under both authorities. STAFF OF 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, SUPRA NOTE 196, at 3. 
200 Id. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012). 
202 Kodish, supra note 150, at 388. 
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all who come near it”203 is such that “it extends to parties classified 
as current owners or operators, owners or operators at the time of 
disposal, generators, arrangers, or transporters.”204  Under this 
definition, any party trying to clean up a site who, “for example, 
removes a small pile of toxic mine tailings that are leaching into a 
river and caps them elsewhere might become liable for remediating 
the entire site, including all hazardous residue generated by historic 
mining operations.”205  The only way for parties to shield themselves 
from CERCLA liability is to clean up the site in compliance with a 
valid Clean Water Act NPDES permit.206 As discussed above in 
Sections I and II, the cost of cleanup for abandoned mine sites can be 
several million dollars, and the permitting requirements under the 
CWA are very difficult to achieve.  Therefore, the “financial 
implications of such liability can be devastating.”207  Fear of future 
liability under CERCLA is a strong barrier to parties interested in 
cleanup efforts.  
 In sum, the fear of potentially unwieldy liability under CERCLA 
and excessively costly compliance under the CWA permitting has 
made it nearly impossible for parties, who otherwise might be 
interested in cleanup, from remediating abandoned mines.  The EPA 
has attempted to allay fears of liability for Good Samaritans,208 yet 
without statutory certainty, parties are afraid to clean up these 
sites.209 Largely in response to these statutory hurdles under the 
CWA, CERCLA, and other environmental statutes, the last decade of 
proposed legislation has focused on “Good Samaritan” waivers for 
                                                            
203 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Living 
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jerry L. Anderson, The 
Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1993)). 
204 Lounsbury, supra note 163. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012). 
205 Lounsbury, supra note 163, at 153. 
206 “Superfund provides liability protection where a release is pursuant to a 
Clean Water Act permit . . . [the] shield is effective as long as the release complies 
with the permit.” STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 196, at 5. 
207 Lounsbury, supra note 163. 
208  See discussion, Section V part C. 
209 Dale Rodebaugh, Does policy offer shelter from legal storm?, DURANGO 
HERALD (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20130218/NEWS01/130219571/0/SEARCH
/Does-policy-offer-shelter-from-legal-storm?. 
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parties who want to try to cleanup mines but do not have the 
resources to take on the liability that might accompany cleanup 
efforts.210  These “Good Samaritans” are “voluntary parties, who did 
not own or operate the abandoned mines or have anything to do with 
causing pollution problems, willing to take steps to reduce the 
environmental, health, and safety problems associated with 
abandoned mine sites.”211  They may include “government agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, mining companies, or other private 
parties” with various motives.212  For example, a fishing group may 
want to reestablish a suitable fishery habitat, a municipality may wish 
to reduce water treatment costs downstream, or a mining company 
may wish to re-mine the land.213  
The main controversies surrounding Good Samaritan legislation 
center on three main concerns.  First, botched cleanup efforts by 
Good Samaritans still threaten health and the environment, and can 
result in additional taxpayer burden.  Second, casting the waivers on 
environmental regulation too broadly might result in “Bad 
Samaritan” mining companies who mine abandoned sites with 
impunity under the guise of a “Good Samaritan” waiver.  Lastly, 
given the exorbitant cost of cleanup, actions by Good Samaritans 
only scratch the surface on the kind of remediation that is necessary 
to address the problem of abandoned mines; an adequate reclamation 
fund would be more suitable for the task. 
As to the first concern, the historical trend has been for 
environmental advocates to oppose “Good Samaritan” legislation out 
of fear that it will do more harm than good.214  The very same 
                                                            
210 Good Samaritan Legislation Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine 
Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS, supra note 170, at note n.vii (citing various 
bills that would have authorized Good Samaritan cleanup). 
211 STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 196, at 4. 
212 See id. 
213 Id. 
214 Good Samaritan Legislation Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine 
Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS, supra note 170. Senator Boxer (CA) has 
expressed similar concerns: “Boxer warned that any good Samaritan legislation 
needs to be crafted carefully to limit ‘unintended consequences.’ Boxer asked 
McCarthy whether the public could be on the hook for the bill if something goes 
wrong when a good Samaritan attempts to clean up these legacy mines.” Leven, 
supra note 91. 
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reasons that some use to support Good Samaritan legislation are often 
used to oppose it: if Good Samaritans are financially incapable of 
bearing the full cost of abandoned mine reclamation, then they 
should not take on the task at risk to taxpayer expense and further 
environmental harm.215  Environmental groups opposed the 
legislation in 2005216 and later in 2013,217 due to “concerns about the 
difficulty of mine remediation” and the potential for failed efforts 
that can make leaks worse.218  It is no surprise that the most recent 
iteration of this type of legislation is similarly met with opposition by 
many environmental organizations, who maintain that “it would 
allow a private entity to create an Animas-type spill, and exempt the 
polluting party from responsibility for their mistake or from 
compensating damaged communities downstream.”219   
On the second account, environmental advocates are concerned 
that some of the proposed legislation creates too large of a loophole 
for liability, and could result in so-called “Bad Samaritans” who 
utilize the legislation to shield themselves from liability while 
gaining a bigger profit.220  In the last decade of proposed legislation, 
“former Colorado senators Ken Salazar and Mark Udall proposed 
laws that would have given special dispensation to groups doing 
mining cleanup.  Udall’s Good Samaritan bill specifically addressed 
the Clean Water Act, while Salazar’s also included permit waivers 
for the Toxic Substances Control and the Solid Waste Disposal 
acts.”221 With broad environmental exemptions to important 
regulations, the concern is that “Bad Samaritan” bills will allow 
“mining companies to re-mine under the guise of clean up.”222  This 
                                                            
215 Susan Cosier, This Land is Mine Land (2015), 
http://www.onearth.org/earthwire/land-mine-land; Lounsbury, supra note 163. 
216 Cleanup of Inactive and Abandoned Mines Act, S.1848, 109th Cong. 
(2005-2006). 
217 Good Samaritan Cleanup of Abandoned Hardrock Mines Act of 2013, 
S.1443, 113th Cong. (2013).  
218 Cosier, supra note 215. 
219 Good Samaritan Legislation Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine 
Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS, supra note 170. 
220 Id. 
221 Cosier, supra note 215. 
222 Good Samaritan Legislation Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine 
Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS, supra note 170. 
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concern maintains that “[e]xtracting metals from the ground for profit 
is mining, not reclamation, and should not be rewarded with liability 
waivers granting permission to pollute.”223   
In response to concerns of “Bad Samaritans,” Roger Flynn, 
director of the Western Mining Action Project, has suggested a 
compromise that would not bar mining companies from acting as 
“Good Samaritans” altogether: allow mining companies to remediate 
lands for a charitable tax write-off, but do not allow them to extract 
any minerals on or near remediated sites.224  This would prevent a 
“free ride” for the mining industry hoping to financially benefit from 
waivers to environmental regulation on abandoned mine sites.225  The 
idea seems reasonable given that mining companies possess the 
equipment, money, and expertise that might allow for successful and 
less-costly remediation, and have an understanding of some of the 
environmental regulations they would need to comply with for any 
regulations that were not waived.  This is an interesting proposal, 
given that most environmental advocates tend to categorically reject 
Good Samaritan statutes. 
Finally, environmental advocates tend to oppose Good Samaritan 
legislation because it distracts from what all advocates have aptly 
pointed out is the biggest issue in remediating abandoned mines: 
money.226  Advocates for responsible mining have noted that, as seen 
at Gold King, “much can go wrong when cleaning up highly polluted 
mine sites. . . [a]dequate funding from a reclamation fee can ensure 
that funding is available to do the work right.”227  Others have noted 
that “[t]he central trouble . . . is that there are few Good Samaritans 
with adequate funding and expertise.  By focusing on enabling Good 
Samaritan cleanups, Congress diverts attention from the larger 
underlying problems: insufficient funds available for reclaiming 
abandoned mines . . . .”228  Essentially, this argument points out the 
practical consideration that, aside from potential “Bad Samaritan” 
                                                            
223 Id. 
224 Telephone interview with Roger Flynn, Director and Managing Attorney, 
Western Mining Action Project (Jan. 5, 2016). 
225 Id. 
226 Good Samaritan Legislation Isn’t the Solution to Our Hardrock Mine 
Reclamation Problem, EARTHWORKS, supra note 170. 
227 Id. 
228 Lounsbury, supra note 163. 
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mining companies, most local non-profit community organizations or 
municipal governments will not have the money to effectuate a 
successful cleanup, and a reclamation fund is better capable of 
handling the millions of dollars in liability involved in abandoned 
mine cleanup. 
Currently, two House bills, H.R. 963 and H.R. 3843, propose 
Good Samaritan waivers.229  Representative Grijalva’s bill, H.R. 963, 
would create more narrowed waivers by only providing waivers to 
the Clean Water Act through a special Good Samaritan discharge 
permit.230  On the other hand, the stand-alone bill, H.R. 3843, 
“proposes Good Samaritan relief from requirements of the CWA and 
[CERCLA].”231  In the Senate, S.2254, the Hardrock Mining and 
Reclamation Act of 2015, (discussed above), no mention is made of 
Good Samaritan provisions.232  
Good Samaritan waivers are a mixed bag, and may result in 
unintended consequences for the overall objective of abandoned mine 
cleanup.  While it may at first glance seem odd to oppose parties’ 
well-intentioned efforts to clean up abandoned sites, in wake of the 
botched Gold King cleanup, it might make sense to limit which 
parties are allowed to take on these projects while also exercising 
significant caution regarding which environmental regulations are 
waived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
229 Hardrock Mining and Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 963, 114th Cong. Title VI 
(2015); Locatable Minerals Claim Location and Maintenance Fees Act of 2015, 
H.R. 3843, 114th Cong (2015). 
230 Hardrock Mining and Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 963, 114th Cong. Title VI 
(2015). 
231 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44285, CLEANUP AT 
INACTIVE AND ABANDONED MINES: ISSUES IN “GOOD SAMARITAN” LEGISLATION IN 
THE 114TH CONGRESS 2 (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44285.pdf. 
232 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2015, S. 2254, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
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V.  POTENTIAL FEDERAL REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
 
A.  Increased Financial Assurances 
 
The Zortman-Landunsky operation in Montana, described in 
Section II, above, provides a perfect case point of insufficient 
financial assurances that result in an undue burden on taxpayer 
shoulders.  Many have taken note that the cost of cleanup often 
exceeds the amount of financial backing that mining companies give 
to state and federal agencies prior to commencing their mining 
operations.  As a result, both proposed House and Senate hardrock 
mining acts, discussed above, include robust permit and financial 
assurance requirements—an essential aspect of legislative mining 
reform.233  However, the EPA already has the power to require 
increased financial assurances under CERCLA 108(b);234 therefore, 
while legislative action might be helpful in further strengthening 
assurance requirements, arguably, no legislative activity is needed. 
Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with this 
reasoning earlier this year in a writ of mandamus action brought 
against the EPA by Earthjustice, a national non-profit environmental 
                                                            
233 Harrington & Louer, supra note 156.  
Both bills propose significant new layers of regulation for 
mining claimants, including requiring claimants to apply for and 
obtain two new federal environmental permits—an exploration 
permit and an operation permit.  Both permit applications would 
require submission of reclamation plans and substantial evidence 
of financial assurances. Under both bills, claimants would be 
forced to hold financial assurances for the duration of the 
mineral activities and until reclamation and long term 
maintenance are complete.  Under the Senate bill, the sufficiency 
of a claimant’s bond, surety, or other financial assurance would 
be subject to public notice and comment to ensure its adequacy 
to complete the reclamation and restoration activities required 
under the Act. 
Id. 
234 Stephen W. Smithson, Hardrock Mining Financial Assurances—Feasible?, 
S&W ENVTL. AND NAT. RES. L. BLOG (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.swlaw.com/blog/environmental-and-natural-
resources/2015/06/19/hardrock-mining-financial-assurances-
feasible/#sthash.fukkdh9u.dpuf. 
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law firm.235  The ruling found that the EPA is now required to 
demand increased financial assurances from hardrock mining 
companies under their obligation to carry out CERCLA.236  The court 
examined the relevant portion of CERCLA, Section 108(b), which 
states that “[b]eginning not earlier than five years after December 11, 
1980, [EPA] shall promulgate requirements . . . that classes of 
facilities establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility 
consistent with the degree and duration of risk associated with the 
production, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of 
hazardous substances.”237  The court noted that in “the intervening 
thirty years since section 108(b) took effect, EPA has made little 
progress toward promulgating any financial assurance 
regulations.”238  Acknowledging the problems of mining companies 
avoiding liability through declaring bankruptcy, discussed in Section 
II above, the court stated “[i]t is a common practice for operators [of 
sites that produce hazardous substances] to avoid paying 
environmental liabilities by declaring bankruptcy or otherwise 
sheltering assets.”239  The D.C. Circuit’s order to the EPA should 
result in finalized rules requiring adequate financial assurances from 
mining companies in the near future.240  
Opponents of increased financial assurances argue that 
imposition of both royalties and financial assurances requirements 
results in “double liability”—that is, mining companies are paying 
both abandoned mine cleanup fees for the damage caused by miners 
decades ago, and they are also required to post reclamation bonds for 
                                                            
235 Court Orders Environmental Protection Agency to Finalize Rules so 
Polluters Pay for Their Own Toxic Messes, EARTHWORKS (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/court_orders_environmental_protec
tion_agency_to_finalize_rules_so_polluters/04270#. 
236 In re Idaho Conservation League, USCA Case #14-1149 Document 
#15960811 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/0/1F012EA1238D7A3C85257
F490054E52E/$file/14-1149-1596081.pdf.   
237 42 U.S.C § 9608(b)(1) (2012). 
238 In re Idaho Conservation League, USCA Case #14-1149 Document 
#15960811 at 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/0/1F012EA1238D7A3C85257
F490054E52E/$file/14-1149-1596081.pdf.   
239 Id. at 10. 
240 Id. 
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their own ongoing activities.241  Arguments are made that excessive 
regulation and fees force mining operations overseas and hurt U.S. 
jobs.242 However, these arguments “hardly pass the straight-face 
test”:  
[w]hile hardrock mining is the only extractive industry 
not to pay a federal royalty, mining companies seem 
to have no trouble paying substantial state royalties 
(e.g., 18 percent for a gold mine in Nevada's Carlin 
Trend). . .  impos[ing] fees of 8 percent or less, which 
the Congressional Research Service concluded 
‘[would] not radically affect mining economics in the 
United States.’243 
Increased financial assurance requirements are an essential aspect 
of hardrock mining reform, and, pursuant to the recent D.C. Circuit 
opinion, must be issued by the EPA in the near future to ensure that 
liability does not continue to fall on taxpayer shoulders. 
 
B.  Renewable Energy on Mining Sites 
 
Renewable energy on mining sites is an unclear regulatory 
solution, and not much has been said on the idea.  It may provide a 
piece to the solution, depending on how it is implemented.  The EPA 
has stated that they have “placed a national priority on showcasing 
opportunities for the development of renewable energy projects on 
contaminated lands, including renewable energy development on 
mining and mineral processing sites.”244 It seems like this potential 
solution might be borrowing from the idea of the Brownfield 
Program under CERCLA, which facilitates re-use of contaminated 
lands.245 
 
 
                                                            
241 Lounsbury, supra note 163, at 200-01. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Abandoned Mine Lands, E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/superfund/abandoned-
mine-lands (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
245 See Brownfields, E.P.A., http://www.epa.gov/brownfields (last visited Feb. 
20, 2016). 
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C. “Good Samaritan” Rulemaking 
 
The EPA can use its regulatory authority to grant waivers to 
“Good Samaritans” to the requirements of CERCLA and the CWA; 
however, it has only issued guidance letters on the subject, and has 
not engaged in regulatory rulemaking.246  In 2007, the EPA issued its 
“Interim Guiding Principles for Good Samaritan Projects at Orphan 
Mine Sites and Transmittal of CERCLA Administrative Tools for 
Good Samaritans.”247  Minor grammatical changes were made to the 
document in 2015.248  The document states that its purpose is to 
“provide greater legal certainty to Good Samaritans and resolve to 
the extent possible the threat of potential federal liabilities so that 
voluntary cleanups at these sites can proceed.”249  Essentially, the 
guidance is a promise from the EPA not to sue Good Samaritans 
under CERCLA for agreed-upon cleanup efforts, and to also defend 
them against third-party lawsuits.250  Five years later, in the “2012 
EPA Good Samaritan Memo,” the EPA issued guidance for Good 
Samaritan waivers to the CWA and clarified CERCLA waivers.251  
These documents appear to demonstrate a willingness by the EPA to 
work with Good Samaritans on cleanup of abandoned mines. 
                                                            
246 See Section IV part B above for discussion of legislative Good Samaritan 
waivers.  Whereas legislative waivers require Congress to pass a law that would 
amend the relevant statute, regulatory waivers rely on the agency’s regulatory 
power to carry out the relevant statute (in this case, the EPA’s regulatory powers to 
carry out CERCLA and the CWA).   
247 Memorandum on Interim Guiding Principles for Good Samaritan Projects 
at Orphan Mine Sites and Transmittal of CERCLA Administrative Tools for Good 
Samaritans, E.P.A., (updated Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/cercla-goodsam-
principles-mem-ed2015.pdf. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 1. 
250 STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 196, at 5. 
251 Memorandum on Clean Water Act § 402 National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Requirements for Good Samaritans at 
Orphan Mine Sites, E.P.A. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/2012-good-
samaritan-memo-signed.pdf. 
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However, “[d]espite the EPA’s issuance of Good Samaritan 
guidance, few parties to date have been willing to proceed ahead with 
Good Samaritan cleanup projects at abandoned mine sites.”252 
Largely, given the incredibly high costs of potential liability, parties 
are still afraid to get involved in cleanup efforts.253  Groups that want 
to clean up are leery, aptly noting that “[t]he guidance is not 
regulation.  It’s not law.”254  Their fear is probably well-founded—
the 2012 EPA Good Samaritan Memo discloses that “[although EPA 
expects] this memorandum to provide clarification regarding permit 
obligations for Good Samaritans, we recognize that it does not 
address or resolve all potential liability associated with discharges 
from abandoned mines.”255   
Environmental advocates voice much of the same concerns over 
regulatory Good Samaritan waivers as they have concerning 
legislative ones.   For example, in reference to CWA waivers, Lauren 
Pagel, policy director for Earthworks, said “[w]hile we applaud the 
EPA for aiding Good Samaritan clean ups of abandoned hardrock 
mines, this policy does nothing to remove the greatest barrier to 
abandoned mine clean-up in the West: a steady funding source.”256  
The most logical way to accomplish this is through imposing 
royalties on mining companies and creating an abandoned mine 
reclamation fund, similar to the system used for cleanup in other 
industries like coal.257  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
If there is one lesson to be learned from abandoned legacy mines, 
it is that they are a legacy that no generation should have to inherit.  
                                                            
252 STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 196, at 5. 
253 Rodebaugh, supra note 209. 
254 Id. 
255 STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 196, at 5. 
256 New EPA Clean Water Act policy aids abandoned mine cleanup, 
EARTHWORKS, (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.earthworksaction.org/media/detail/new_epa_clean_water_act_policy_
aids_abandoned_mine_cleanup#.Vp34Hjbe3wx. 
257 See discussion, supra, Section IV part A.   
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The acid mine drainage from these sites alone causes significant 
threats to the health of humans and river ecosystems, threatening the 
availability of clean water for our children and for us.  Cleanup of 
these sites is excessively costly, and presents the potential for 
botched cleanup efforts that result in even greater harms than the 
slow, everyday release of acid mine drainage.  In recent years, the 
scale of mining operations has become larger than life.  Who will 
clean up these sites in the next century when the mining companies 
that created these operations close up shop and disperse?  What will 
our grandchildren say when rivers are not orange because of a 
catastrophic spill, but because it is the “norm” due to acid and toxic 
metals leaching from these gigantic industrial mines?  Hardrock 
mining not only leaves a toxic legacy, but it also leaves an expensive 
one.  As responsible citizens, we need to learn from the mistakes of 
the legacy left to us by our ancestors and prevent ourselves from 
passing it along with even greater toxic dividends to the next 
generations.  Toxic legacy mines are a legacy that no generation can 
afford to inherit, and policy and regulations need to be put in place 
that facilitate remediation of abandoned mines.   
 
